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Denials in discourse





The central characteristic of denials is that they perform a non-mono-
tonic correction operation on discourse structure. A second character-
istic is that they may be used to object to various kinds of information
including presuppositions and implicatures. In this paper we first use
standard DRT to capture these features, implement an earlier pro-
posal of van der Sandt (1991) in DRT and point out a shortcoming of
that approach. We then adopt Layered DRT. LDRT is an extension
of standard DRT designed to represent and interpret different types
of information conveyed in a conversation by distributing them over
separate layers of the same LDRS. We will then show how LDRT al-
lows us to solve the problems of the classic monostratal system. The
resulting system makes use of a directed reverse anaphora mechanism
to locate, remove and negate the material objected to.
1 Introduction
In the literature on denial and correction we can roughly distinguish two
views. The dominant view has it that these phenomena are best captured
within a general view of the semantics and pragmatics of negation. In terms
of speech act theory this means that negatory force is located in the neg-
ative morpheme. A particular influential statement of this view is found
in Horn (1985, 1989), who distinguishes between an ordinary ‘descriptive’
negation operator and a so-called metalinguistic negation. The former is the
standard logical connective contributing to truth-conditional content, the
latter is a non-truth-functional device that is meant to account for rejection
of non-propositional material. This comprises objections to implicatural
and presuppositional information, and to infelicities arising from style and
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register. Horn characterizes this operator as a metalinguistic device which
can be used to signal an objection to an utterance on whatever grounds.
This view has a number of drawbacks. It implies that some instances of of
natural language negation are not interpretable by semantic means. It also
implies an ambiguity in natural language negation which is not realized in
any known language.
We defend a second view according to which the semantic notion of nega-
tion and the speech act notion of denial are fully independent. Denial pat-
terns with assertion in that its nature and function should be accounted for
in terms of the discourse effects it gives rise to. Just as the primary function
of assertion is to convey new information, the primary function of a denial
is to object to information which has been entered before and to remove it
from the discourse record. The central characteristic of denial then is that it
performs a non-monotonic correction operation on contextual information.
This approach has several advantages. It yields a uniform account of denial,
which comprises the standard ‘propositional’ and the marked cases, it does
not force us to postulate an ambiguity in the natural language negation, and
by incorporating ideas from Levinson (2000), van Leusen (1994, to appear)
and van der Sandt (1991, 2003) it can be implemented in a natural way in
a dynamic theory of discourse interpretation.
2 Denials
2.1 Denial versus assertion
Van der Sandt(1991) proposed a theory of assertion and denial in terms of
their discourse function. In this paper he argued there that there is no in-
herent connection whatsoever between the concepts of denial and negation.
Instead this theory explained the semantic and pragmatic properties of de-
nials in terms of their discourse effects. The theory comprises proposition
denials, presupposition denials, implicature denials and Horn’s style and reg-
ister cases, that is it aimed to give a unified account of standard proposition
denials and the marked cases which Horn labeled ‘metalinguistic negation’.
This theory adopts Horn’s (1985, 1989) observation that denials can be used
to reject an utterance of a previous speaker for whatever reasons. As Horn
points out, a speaker may simply object to its truth or reject it in virtue
of the presuppositions associated, the implicatures invoked or other infer-
ences of non-truth-conditional nature. This account diverges from Horn’s in
generalizing the latter to standard proposition denials, and by rejecting his
distinction between a standard truth-functional operator for the unmarked
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cases and a non-truth-functional metalinguistic device for the marked ones.
On Horn’s account the well-known truth-functional operator is found in
negative assertions and proposition denials, while his non-truthfunctional
metalinguistic device is taken to be an operator which does not apply to
sentences but to utterances. This boils down to equating the notions of
denial and negation, results in an ambiguity in the negation operator and
forces us to account for the standard unmarked cases in a different way.
The alternative divorces the semantic contribution of the negation operator
from its discourse effects and thus separates the semantic from the pragmatic
aspects.
We would like to stress that both assertion and denial are concepts of
speech act theory and that both notions should thus be explained in terms
of their discourse function. The essential function of assertion is to intro-
duce new information. The function of a denial is to object to a previous
utterance. And the utterance objected to may have been made by means
of a positive or negative sentence. So, depending on the polarity of the
utterance objected to, a denial may be a negative or a positive statement.
Thus while (1b) can naturally be used as a denial of(1a), (1a) can equally
naturally be used as a denial of (1b):1
(1) a. Herb is tolerant.
b. Herb is not tolerant.
Negation on the other hand is an operation on sentences. Negative sen-
tences will thus always contain some sign of negation. And the the sentence
resulting from applying the negation operator can, of course, be uttered
with assertoric force. It is thus essential to distinguish between assertions of
negative sentences and denials. The defining characteristic of assertions is
that they introduce new information. They are purely incremental in that
the context resulting from its utterance is augmented with the information
conveyed. They can moreover occur naturally in isolation. Denials on the
other hand always constitute objections to utterances of a previous speaker
thereby involving a correction operation on contextual information. They
are not incremental in the sense assertions are, nor can they naturally occur
1The difficulty of making sense of denials as negative statements comes out clearly in
the following remark by Frege
. . . , it is by no means easy to state what is a negative judgment (thought).
Consider the sentences “Christ is immortal”, “Christ lives for ever”, “Christ
is not immortal”, “Christ does not live for ever”. Now which of the thoughts
here is affirmative, which negative? Frege (1918)
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in isolation. If processed as the first sentence of a discourse (1a) or (1b) will
not be interpreted as a denial but as a straightforward assertion. However,
if uttered after (1a) sentence (1b) will be interpreted as a denial of a positive
sentence and when uttered after (1b) (1a) will be interpreted as the denial
of a negative sentence. Thus since the positive (1a) can naturally be used
as a denial of (1b), it will be clear that a denial doesn’t need to contain a
negation sign.
2.2 Marked denials
Denials come in many varieties. Two examples of ‘positive’ denials are given
under B. We will see below that positive denials exhibit exactly the same
characteristics as their negative counterparts. And as Horn showed, they
may be used to affect whatever part of the information conveyed by the
utterance objected to. The propositional denials under B are the unmarked
cases. The objection of the speaker concerns the truth of the propositions
expressed. The denials in C through E are marked in that the objections of
the speaker concern some part of the preivious message which need not be
truth-conditional in nature.
A. Assertions of negative sentences
(2) Mary is unhappy.
(3) Mary is not happy.
(4) It does not matter that Mary read your letters.
B. ‘Propositional’ denials
(5) Mary is not happy. (as a reaction to the utterance of ‘Mary is happy’)
(6) Mary is happy. (as a reaction to the utterance of (2) or (3))
(7) It does matter that Mary read my letters. (as a reaction to the
utterance of (4))
C. Presuppositional denials
(8) The king of France is not bald–France does not have a king
(9) Virginia cannot know that the earth is flat.
(10) John did not stop smoking, he never smoked.
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D. Implicature denials
(11) It is not possible, it is necessary that the pope is right.
(12) That haggis is not good, it is excellent.
(13) That wasn’t a lady I kissed last night–it was my wife.
E. A variety of connotations (conventional implicature, style, reg-
ister)
(14) That is not a steed–it’s a horse.
(15) Grandma did not kick the bucket–she passed away.
(16) They did not f*%$ (engage in sexual intercourse etc.)–they made
love.
2.3 Some linguistic facts
Negations in denials do not allow for lexical incorporation. While (8) and
(11) are marked, but naturally interpretable, (17) and (18) amount to sheer
contradiction:
(17) ?It is impossible, it is necessary that the pope is right.
(18) ?The king of France is unhappy–France does not have a king.
And note furthermore that positive and negative polarity elements exhibit
the distribution that is predicted for simple assertoric sentences:
(i) Denials containing negative morphemes accept positive polarity elements:
(19) John does NOT still live in Paris–he did live there but has moved
now to his girlfriend’s in Lyon. (propositional denial)
(20) John does NOT still live in Paris–he has never set foot in France
(presuppositional denial)
(21) Johnny did not eat SEVERAL cookies–he ate them all
(implicature denial)
(ii) ’Positive’ denials (denials without a negative element) can accept nega-
tive polarity elements:
(22) It DOES matter that my bunny is dead.
(23) Virginia DOES mind that her bunny has died.
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Note again that none of these sentences is interpretable as the first utterance
in a discourse. They all evoke a strong ‘echo’. (19) through (21) suggest
that the corresponding non-negative sentence has been uttered just before,
(23) and (23) that their negated counterparts have just been uttered.
These examples are all clear exceptions to the rule that negative polarity
elements require negation for their carrier sentence to be acceptable and that
sentences containing positive polarity elements don’t accept negation. Note
first that positive polarity elements are equally acceptable in proposition,
presupposition and implicature denials:
(24) John did not eat SOME cookies (he ate them all).
(25) Mary does NOT still beat her donkey (she has never beaten it).
(26) Clara does not feel unHAPPY (she feels miserable).
Note further that, even when we omit the clarificatory continuations, none
of these sentences allows for an assertoric interpretation. An interpretation
of (24) as the assertion of a negative sentence is excluded. And in (26)
double negation does not hold.
Similar observations can be made with respect to sentences containing
negative polarity elements.
(27) It does not matter that Mary has read my letters.
(28) Johnny did not pick any of the flowers.
While neither of these negative sentences can be interpreted as an echoic
denial, a sentence containing a negative polarity element but lacking nega-
tion can only be interpreted as a rejection of a previous statement as as (23)
illustrates.
The proper conclusion seems to be that the phenomenon is in principle
independent of presupposition denial or marked negation. Polarity reversal
is a phenomenon attached to denials in general and an explanation is not
difficult to find.
The relevant difference is a difference of use. It is the difference between
the use of a negative sentence to convey new information and its use as a
denial of a previous utterance. As I stressed before the defining characteristic
of denials is that they refer to and reject a previous utterance. They simply
retain the polarity of the sentence they take op or echo.
6
2.4 A semantic view: shifting denotations
Van der Sandt (1991, 2003) gives a mechanism in a Stalnaker-type frame-
work to locate and remove the information conveyed by a previous utterance
in a discourse in order to account for the non-incremental behavior of de-
nials in discourse. Though many sentences can both be used with assertoric
or denial force some only allow an interpretation as denial. Sentence (29a)
and(29b) are cases in point. A denial needs some object to deny and this
object normally is an utterance made by the previous speaker. Thus (29b)
and (30b), which do not have an assertoric use will naturally occur in con-
texts in which the corresponding a-sentences have been uttered (or at least
suggested) and are very odd indeed, if uttered out of the blue.
(29) a. c1 A: It is possible that the pope is right.
b. c2 B: It is not POSSIBLE, it is NECESSARY that the pope is
right.
(30) a. c1 A: The king of France is bald.
b. c2 B: The king of France is NOT bald—France does not have
a king.
By uttering (29b) the speaker rejects (29a) on the grounds that it conveys the
implicature that it is not necessary that the pope is right. By his utterance of
(30b) he objects to the utterance of (30a) because this utterance presupposes
that there is a king of France. The important point to note is that the
implicature objected to is not an implicature invoked by (29b), but the
implicature conveyed by , i.e. the previous utterance. The first part, which
is the denial proper, takes up or echoes the implicature invoking utterance,
the the continuation of corrector makes clear that the reason for the rejection
does not concern its propositional content, but the falsity of the implicature
conveyed. We observe the same in (30b). The presupposition objected to is
not a presupposition associated with this sentence, but the presuppositional
information associated with the previous utterance. Again the utterance of
the previous speaker is taken up or echoed in the first conjunct, the denial,
the reason for the rejection, falsity of its presupposition, is given in correcting
continuation.
In standard semantics ‖¬ϕ‖c will be computed in terms of the value ϕ
has in c. But in the examples at issue the embedded occurrence of ϕ does
not just function as a component sentence whose value has to be computed
in the standard way with respect to the context in which it is uttered.
The sentence uttered and, concomitantly, the information conveyed by its
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utterance is taken up or echoed from the previous one. So if we take seriously
the idea that by denying an utterance a speaker can object to any type of
information conveyed by it, there is no need to stick to the assumption that
the semantic value of ¬ϕ in a context should always be computed in terms
of the value ϕ would have had if it had been uttered here. From a semantic
point of view the obvious object to assign is the full informative content of
the previous utterance. This comprises the contribution of presuppositions,
implicatures and other non-truthconditional inferences. Negation may thus
be taken to apply to the sum of the propositional content and all information
which is conveyed by non-truthconditional means. Under such an analysis
we don’t need to analyse (29b) or (30b) by means of a new negation operator,
be it Horn’s non-truthfunctional device or some presupposition cancelling
operator for (30b).
This is easy to see. Consider (29a) again. By his utterance in c1 A
states that it is possible that the pope is right and implicates that this is not
necessarily so. Thus, if we assign to the content of B’s denial the informative
content of the previous utterance instead of the proposition that would be
expressed by It is possible that the pope is right in c2, B’s utterance will get
an interpretation which can be paraphrased as follows:
(31) ¬ [2 the pope is right ∧ ¬ it is necessary that the pope is right]
∧ 2 the pope is right
This simply conveys that it is necessary that the pope is right and rejects
all the information conveyed by the previous utterance. We will sketch a
formal account of such a solution in section 3.4 to 3.6.
3 Denials in DRT
3.1 Anaphora resolution in DRT
Before we present our account of denial formally in an extension of Dis-
course Representation theory, we first want to give a short sketch of the
way anaphoric expressions are resolved in DRT and show why the standard
accommodation mechanism is unsuited to treat the phenomenon of presup-
positional and other marked varieties of denial.
The anaphoric account of presuppositions views presuppositional expres-
sions as anaphoric expressions that should be resolved in discourse. Func-
tionally they are on a par with pronouns. They refer back to and should
link up with an antecedent that has previously been established in an evolv-
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ing discourse. But presuppositional expressions distinguish themselves from
pronouns or other types of semantically unloaded anaphors in one major re-
spect. Presuppositional expressions carry information and have descriptive
content. The information they carry does a double duty. In the binding
process the descriptive content of a presuppositional anaphor has a disam-
biguating role. It may enable the hearer to select an antecedent out of a
number of possible candidates. With respect to accommodation their in-
formation content has an even more important role. If no antecedent is
available, it gives presuppositional expressions the capacity to establish an
accessible antecedent by means of a default process of filling in information
which may be implicitly assumed but which has not been explicitly intro-
duced in the DRS established thus far. Faced with a presupposition-inducing
utterance the hearer will first try to bind the presuppositional expression to
a suitable antecedent. If this strategy fails the hearer will fill in the missing
information so as to establish an accessible antecedent after all.
The following examples illustrate both the binding and the accommoda-
tion mechanism:
(32) If Sally has a dog, her dog will be a happy animal.
(33) If Sally is out, her dog barks.
Adopting Beaver’s notation to encode presuppositional material by a special
condition the presuppositional anaphorMary’s/her dog comes out as follows:
∂[z: dog(z), has(x,z)]. Let us assume that the initial context is empty.
Assuming furthermore that the presupposition induced by the proper name
has been dealt with and abstracting from details, the DRS constructed for
(32) can be represented as follows:
(34) [x: Sally(x), [y: dog(y), has(x,y)] → [∂[z: dog(z), has(x,z)], happy-
animal(z)]]
Note that this DRS is provisional in the sense that it contains the represen-
tation of ‘her dog’ as an unresolved anaphoric expression. This expression
will search for an appropriate antecedent to link up with. Here the protasis
of the conditional provides an appropriate antecedent. The presuppositional
expression will be bound to this pre-established antecedent and the infor-
mation triggered will thus be absorbed by its target. This yields (35) as the
resulting DRS:
(35) [x: Sally(x), [y: dog(y), has(x,y)] → [: happy-animal(y)]
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This correctly predicts that by his utterance of (32) a speaker does not
presuppose that Sally has a dog. Resolution proceeds differently in (33).
The initial DRS for this sentence looks as follows:
(36) [x: Sally(x), [: out(x)] → [∂[y: dog(y),has(x,y)], bark(y)]
Again the resolution mechanism will search for an appropriate antecedent
first checking the protasis of the conditional and subsequently the main
context. But now the search will fail. Note, however, that the sentence will
be felicitous in a context which contains the information that Sally has a
dog. A co-operative speaker will thus accommodate the presuppositional
material. Since, as a general rule, accommodation will take place as high as
possible, the presupposition will end up in the main context thus yielding
(37):
(37) [x, y: Sally(x), dog(y), has(x,y), [: out(x)] → [:bark(y)]
This correctly captures the meaning of (33).
3.2 Non-global accommodation
Accommodation will preferably take place in the main context but threat-
ening inconsistency or pragmatic infelicity of the resulting structure may
force us to accommodate the presuppositional material in some subordinate
context. The first happens in (38) and the second in (39):
(38) Sally has no dog, so it was not Sally’s dog that bit her neighbour.
(39) Maybe Sally has no dog, but it is also possible that her dog is in
hiding.
(40) and (41) illustrate that neither (38) nor(39) is acceptable in a context
that contains the information that Sally has a dog:
(40) ?Sally has a dog. . . Sally has no dog, so it was not Sally’s dog that
bit her neighbour.
(41) ?Sally has a dog. . .Maybe Sally has no dog, but it is also possible
that her dog is in hiding.
Consider first (38) . Once the first conjunct has been interpreted and the
information that Mary has no dog has been established in the discourse
structure, subsequent accommodation of the presuppositional information
will result in a contradictory structure. So the default strategy of accommo-
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dation into the main context is blocked. Accommodation will now take place
one level lower, that is under the scope of the negation operator. Processing
(42) thus will thus resolve it to (43):
(42) [x: Sally(x), ¬ [y: dog(y), has(x,y)], ¬[∂[z: dog(z), has(x,z)], bit-
neighbour(z)]
(43) [x: Sally(x), ¬[y: dog(y), has(x,y)], ¬[z: dog(z), has(x,z), bit-
neighbour(z)]]
As in (38) the presupposition of (39) will be resolved under the scope of the
embedding operator. Again accommodation in the main context is blocked.
Though, in this case, accommodation would not result in plain contradiction,
it would nevertheless violate Grice’s Quantity principle. The presupposition
is thus accommodated locally, which yields (44) as the final representation:
(44) [x: Sally(x), 3[: ¬[y: dog(y), has(x,y], 3 [z: dog(z), has(x,z), in-
hiding(z)]]
In the examples just given accommodation acts as a strategy to adjust the
representation structure under construction. If the context of utterance does
not contain an appropriate antecedent for a presuppositional expression the
algorithm will try to construct one and will be able to do so in view of the
descriptive content associated with the trigger. Viewed this way accommo-
dation thus acts as a repair strategy intended to ensure interpretation even
if a presuppositional anaphor cannot be bound. We may however look at
this process from a different point of view: the accommodation mechanism
may be viewed as a process which both generates and constrains the scope
of presuppositional anaphors.
Let us return to the first conjunct of (8) and observe how the algorithm
yields the wide and narrow scope readings for presuppositional expressions.
(45) The king of France is not bald.
Assuming that the incoming DRS is empty the initial structure is (46):
(46) [: ¬[∂[x: KF(x)], bald(x)]]
The structure does not provide an antecedent for the presuppositional ex-
pression. So the latter has to be accommodated. The structure provides
two accommodation sites. Accommodation may ensue either globally in the
main context or it will take place locally in the subordinate structure. The
first option produces (47a), the second (47b).
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(47) a. [x; KF(x), ¬[:bald(x)]]]
b. [: ¬[x: KF(x), bald(x)]]
Given the preference for accommodation as high as possible (47a) is the
default option and will ceteris paribus be preferred. However in (8) where
it is already stated in the second conjunct that there is no king of France,
accommodation at top level would be blocked in view of inconsistency of the
resulting structure and (47b) would be the only solution. The full represen-
tation is of ?? is thus (48).
(48) [: ¬[x: KF(x), bald(x), ¬[x: KF(x)]
This structure is equivalent to (47b). At first sight the accommodation
mechanism thus seems to yield the same result as the echo-analysis.2 This
explanation is not tenable, however. We had to assume that (8) was uttered
in an empty context. But as we already pointed out a couple of times, the
typical feature of such utterances is that they require a context in which the
non-negative sentence has been uttered just before, that is a context as in
(30b). And with respect to an incoming context that contains the offensive
material the sentence cannot even be processed in view of the fact that this
would result in a plain contradiction. The explanation thus does not capture
the fact that sentences like (30b) can not occur in isolation and can only
be uttered with ‘denial force’. It puts presupposition denials on a par with
cases like (39) where local accommodation has a very different function and,
last but not least, by relying on the mechanism of presupposition resolution
the analysis does not generalize to other types of marked and unmarked
denials. A proper analysis thus has to rely on a dialogue system and has to
incorporate an account of the non-monotonic update effects that are required
to process such denials in the first place.
3.3 Dialogue
In section 2.4 we sketched the outline of an account which does not only gen-
eralize to different kinds of denials but also accounts for the non-monotonic
update effects.3 An implementation of this account in DRT requires some
minor extensions to standard DRT; we need to keep track of who said what
and when in a dialogue in order to locate and remove a previous speaker’s
2See Geurts (1998) for a defense off this analysis with respect to presuppositional
denials.
3See (van der Sandt 1991) for details
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contribution. We let a discourse be a sequence of sentences, σ1, . . . , σn.4
The first addition to the syntax of the DRS language is harmless: we index
every DRS condition and reference marker with a natural number specifying
the sentence σi it originated from.5
Our goal is now to incrementally build DRSs, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, representing
the various stages of the ongoing discourse. We assume a given background
representation ϕ0 as starting point for the incrementation process.
3.4 Star conditions and reverse anaphora
In the following we will assume that whenever an utterance is analyzed as a
denial of a previous utterance, this denial is not further parsed, but leaves
a simple negated ?-condition (¬[ ? : ? ]) in the DRS. DRS-construction
now proceeds as follows. We first construct a preliminary sentence DRS
from the parse of the sentence and merge it with the background DRS. The
presuppositional resolution mechanism we sketched in section 3.1 will then
bind or accommodate the unresolved presuppositions and other anaphoric
expressions 6. In the case of an assertoric utterance the output of this
process is a new DRS which monotonically accumulates the new information
conveyed by the utterance.
However, if the utterance under consideration gives rise to a ?-condition,
we resolve it by a mechanism we call reverse anaphora. This mechanism col-
lects all material originating from the previous utterance and moves it to the
position of the ?. Reverse anaphora thus has a non-monotonic effect on the
discourse structure established: the contribution of the previous utterance is
removed from the main DRS and the material it originally introduced ends
up under the scope of the negation introduced by the denial.7
3.5 Examples I
The following example of a presupposition denial illustrates the procedure
in some detail:
4We will sometimes use the terms ‘utterance’ and ‘sentence’ rather loosely. The idea
behind our terminology is that an utterance can be conceived of as a sentence combined
with a representation of the context, where our notion of context comprises both a DRS
representing the common ground and a Kaplanian context specifying the actual world,
the speaker and the time of the sentence under discussion.
5Who said what and when can now be encoded in DRS conditions like speaker(x,37)
and time(t,37), meaning that x uttered σ37 at time t.
6See van der Sandt (1992) and Geurts (1999) for detailed expositions
7Cf. the account of Levinson (2000) who calls this process quasi-anaphora
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(49) σ1 The King of France walks in the park.
σ2 No, he doesn’t,
σ3 No, he doesn’t, France doesn’t have a king.
We assume that the background ϕ0 is empty. The presuppositional ex-
pression of σ1 thus has to be accommodated. We denote the algorithms
responsible for building preliminary sentence DRSs, resolution, and reverse
anaphora, as Prel, Res, and RA respectively. ⊕ is the merge operator.
Prel(σ) is thus the preliminary DRS that is constructed out of the parse of
σ. ϕ ⊕ Prel(σ) is the merge of the representation of σ with the incoming
DRS ϕ, and Res(ϕ ⊕ Prel(σ)) denotes the resolved structure. In case a
structure contains an ?-condition we apply the RA-algorithm.
- Prel(σ1) =
[ : ∂[ x1 : King of France1(x) ], walk in park1(x) ]
- ϕ1 = Res(ϕ0 ⊕Prel(σ1)) =
[ x1 : King of France1(x), walk in park1(x) ]
- ϕ1 ⊕Prel(σ2) =[
x1 : King of France1(x), walk in park1(x), ¬2[ ? : ? ]
]





x1 : King of France1(x), walk in park1(x),
¬2[ x1 : King of France1(x), walk in park1(x) ]
]
- ϕ3 = Res(ϕ2 ⊕Prel(σ3)) =[
: ¬2[ x1 : King of France1(x), walk in park1(x) ],
¬3[ x3 : King of France3(x) ]
]
The upshot is that the final interpretation, ϕ3, is equivalent to the predicate
logical formula ¬∃x[KF(x)∧walk(x)]∧¬∃x[KF(x)] which is easily seen to
be equivalent to the intuitively correct ¬∃x[KF(x)].
The resolution of the following example where σ1 is rejected by σ2 in
view of the implicature invoked by the former, runs analogously. We assume
that the existence of the pope has already been established in the incoming
context.
(50) σ1 It is possible the Pope is right.
σ2 No, it’s not POssible,
σ3 it’s NEcessary that he’s right.




: ∂[x1 : pope1(x)],31[: right1(x)],¬21[: right1(x)]
]
- ϕ1 = Res(ϕ0 ⊕Prel(σ1)) =
[





: ¬2[? : ?]
]
- ψ = Res(ϕ1 ⊕Prel(σ2)) =
[
x0 : pope0(x), 31[: right1(x)],
¬21[: right1(x)], ¬2[? : ?]
]
- ϕ2 = RA(ψ) =
[
x0 : pope0(x), 31[: right1(x)], ¬21[: right1(x)],
¬2[: 31[: right1(x)],¬21[: right1(x)]]
]
- Prel(σ3) = [: ∂[z3 : masc3(z)], 23[: right3(z)]]
- ϕ3 =
[
x0 : pope0(x), ¬2[: 31[: right1(x)],¬21[: right1(x)]],
23[: right3(x)]
]
The final structure is equivalent to the predicate logical formula ∃x[pope(x)∧
2 right(x)
]
. This is as it should be. The denial is not contradictory as would
be predicted under a straightforward translation. The contextual material
survives, the contribution of the previous speaker is removed and the second
conjunct of the denial absorbs the first one.
3.6 Problems
The solution given in the previous section is not without problems, how-
ever. Strawson’s famous (51) illustrates that we cannot always just remove
whatever is conveyed by the offensive utterance:
(51) a. A man jumped off the bridge.
b. He didn’t jump, he was pushed.
Strawson (1952)
When processing (52b) we need to retain the discourse referent introduced
for the man in (52a) in order to bind the anaphoric pronoun.
Geurts (1998) argued against the strategy of removing the full contribu-
tion of the utterance objected to, pointing out that the problem is a general
one. Consider an example where several presuppositions are involved.
(52) a. The King of France knows I quit smoking.
b. No he doesn’t, France doesn’t have a king.
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The presupposition objected to is that France has a king and should be
removed from the discourse record. The presupposition that I quit smoking
seems to pass unharmed. We thus need to allow for the possibility that the
final representation retains the latter information.
Another argument against removing the full contribution of a sentence
is the fact that speakers sometimes overtly acknowledge parts of the last
utterance’s contribution while rejecting other parts. A case in point is (53)
where the second speaker confirms that the person referred to is nice, but
denies the implicature evoked by the use of the indefinite term ‘a lady’.8
(53) a. Now, THAT’s a nice lady
b. Yes, she is, but she’s not a LAdy, she’s my WIfe
In order to account for examples like (53) we need to represent and interpret
different types of information conveyed by the very same utterance sepa-
rately, thus enabling us to remove specific types information while retaining
others. 9
4 Using layers
We will use layered representations in order to direct the reverse anaphora
module at the offensive material only. This requires a further extension of
DRT which enables us to both encode and interpret the various kinds of
information. We adopt Layered DRT (or LDRT for short).
8Adapted from the classic:
A: That was a nice lady I saw you with last night.
B: That wasn’t a LAdy, that was my WIfe
Note that by his utterance B certainly does not imply that his wife is not a lady as a
purely truth-functional analysis would predict. Grice (1989: 37) remarks: ‘Anyone who
uses a sentence of the form X is meeting a woman this evening would normally implicate
that the person to be met was someone other than X’s wife, mother, sister, or perhaps
even close platonic friend.’
9In the next section we present a solution which relies on layered representations. An
alternative is to exploit the information structure of a sentence. Note that the denial
part of an utterance as ‘That wasn’t a LADY I kissed last night. It was my wife’ invokes
a focal background λx[ I kissed x last night]. Assuming that focal backgrounds can
be strengthened to existential presupposition, this information would project out to the
main context thus accommodating the information that I kissed someone last night. The
algoritm in the previous section would then just remove the information that the person
kissed is my wife. On this account all non-focal information would thus survive. Such a
solution needs a careful analysis of the rather complicated information structure of the
various kinds of denials and will be explored in a follow up paper.
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4.1 LDRT’s syntax
The syntax of LDRT is like that of standard DRT, except that every dis-
course referent and DRS condition is paired with a layer label, specifying
which kind of information it encodes. For the purpose of this paper we in-
dex every label with a number corresponding to the number of the sentence
from which it originated (and 0 for background information). We will here
restrict ourselves to the set of labels Λ0 given in (54):
(54) Λ0 = {0, fr1, . . . , frn, acc1, . . . , accn, imp1, . . . , impn, pr1, . . . , prn}
a. fri ≈ the Frege layer, what is “said” in the contribution of σi
b. acci ≈ accommodated material coming from pi-layer
c. impi ≈ implicature invoked by σi
d. pi ≈ presupposition triggered by σi
The primitive symbols of our LDRT language fragment are:
(55) a. a set X of reference markers
b. (for some n) a set Pred(n) of n-place predicates
c. the set Λ0 of layer labels
The syntactic rules are as follows:
(56) a. if x ∈ X , L ⊆ Λ0, then xL = 〈x, L〉 ∈ X × ℘(Λ) is a labeled
reference marker
b. if P ∈ Predn, L ⊆ Λ0, then PL is a labeled predicate
c. if x, y ∈ X , L ⊆ Λ0, then x =L y is a labeled condition
d. if x1, . . . , xn ∈ X , PL a labeled n-place predicate, then PL(x1, . . . , xn)
is a labeled condition
e. if ϕ and ψ are labeled conditions, L ⊆ Λ0, then ¬Lϕ, ϕ ∨L ψ,
and ϕ⇒L ψ are labeled conditions
f. if U is a set of labeled reference markers and Con a set of
labeled conditions, then 〈U,Con〉 is an LDRS (notation: ϕ =
〈U(ϕ), Con(ϕ)〉)
The following is an example of a sentence and its preliminary LDRS
representation:10
(57) a. σ1 = It is possible the Pope is right.
b.
[
xpr1 : popepr1(x),3fr1 [: rightfr1(x)],¬2imp1 [: rightimp1(x)]
]
10We will use ¬2imp1 [ : rightimp1(x) ] as a notational shorthand for ¬imp1
[




This representation encodes the fact that the definite description ‘the Pope’
has a presuppositional status. Given an individual that satisfies this predi-
cate the classical truthconditional (Fregean) contribution is that he is possi-
bly right, and with a typical utterance of σ1 the speaker furthermore conveys
the implicature that he is not necessarily right. The crucial feature of the
LDRT representation is that all conditions inhabit their own layer but nev-
ertheless employ one and the same reference marker; the presuppositional,
assertoric and implicature expressions are all linked to the same discourse
referent, thus capturing the fact that they all attribute some property to the
same individual.
4.2 LDRT’s semantics
The idea of LDRT’s semantics is that the truth definition is relativized to
a set of labels, which means that we ignore all material labeled otherwise.
The truth definition is thus only a minor extension of the standard definition
of truth for DRSs in terms of verifying or truthful embeddings (Kamp and
Reyle 1993; Geurts 1999), requiring only two small adaptations: First, since
ignoring certain layers often causes the remaining layers to form only an
incomplete representation, missing perhaps some essential reference markers,
the truth definition should be partial, i.e. for some choices of layer sets a
truthvalue is undefined. In the following we will use ↑ and ↓ to abbreviate
undefinedness and definedness respectively.
Secondly, since we are going to talk about propositions, we need at least
intensional models for interpreting our LDRT language fragment, i.e. we
need possible worlds:
(58) An intensional model is a quadruple, 〈D,W,R, I〉, with:
a. D a set of individuals
b. W a set of possible worlds
c. R ⊆W 2, an accessibility relation on possible worlds
d. I an interpretation function mapping basic predicates onto their
intensions
In (60) we give our partial truth-definition with respect to such models, but
first we introduce some notational shorthands:
(59) For L ⊆ Λ0, an LDRS ϕ ,and embedding functions f, g, define:
a. UL(ϕ) = {x ∈ X | ∃K[K ∩ L 6= ∅ ∧ xK ∈ U(ϕ)]}
b. ConL(ϕ) = {ψ | ψ is an LDRS condition ∧ ∃K[K ∩ L 6= ∅ ∧
ψK ∈ Con(ϕ)]}
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c. f [X]g = f ⊆ g ∧Dom(g) = Dom(f) ∪X
(60) Let M = 〈D,W,R, I〉 be an intensional model. Let f be a partial
embedding of the set of reference markers into D, L ⊆ Λ0, w ∈ W ,






∣∣ f [UL(ϕ)]g ∧ ∀ψ ∈ Con(ϕ)[‖ψ‖gL,w = 1]} if ∃g[f [UL(ϕ)]g ∧
∀ψ ∈ Con(ϕ)[‖ψ‖gL,w ↓ ]]
↑ otherwise
b. ‖x =K y‖fL,w

1 if K ∩ L = ∅ or(
x, y ∈ Dom(f) and f(x) = f(y))
0 if K ∩ L 6= ∅, x, y ∈ Dom(f),
and f(x) 6= f(y)
↑ otherwise
c. ‖PK(x1, . . . , xn)‖fL,w

1 if K ∩ L = ∅ or(
x1, . . . , xn ∈ Dom(f) and
〈f(x1), . . . , f(xn)〉 ∈ I(P )(w)
)
0 if K ∩ L 6= ∅,
x1, . . . , xn ∈ Dom(f), and




1 if K ∩ L = ∅ or ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w = ∅
0 if K ∩ L 6= ∅, ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w ↓ , and
‖ψ‖fK∩L,w 6= ∅
↑ otherwise
e. ‖ψ ∨K χ‖fL,w

1 if ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w ↓, ‖χ‖fK∩L,w ↓,
and ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w ∪ ‖χ‖fK∩L,w 6= ∅
0 if ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w = ‖χ‖fK∩L,w = ∅
↑ otherwise
f. ‖ψ ⇒K χ‖fL,w

1 if ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w ↓ and ∀g ∈ ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w :
‖χ‖gK∩L,w ↓ and ‖χ‖gK∩L,w 6= ∅





1 if ∀w′Rw : ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w′ ↓ and 6= ∅
0 if ∃w′Rw : ‖ψ‖fK∩L,w′ = ∅
↑ otherwise
Layered propositions or contents expressed by LDRSs are defined as follows:
(61) a. CfL(ϕ) =
{{
w
∣∣∃g ∈ ‖ϕ‖fL,w} if ∃w[‖ϕ‖fL,w ↓]
↑ otherwise
b. CL(ϕ) = C∅L(ϕ)
This defines a wide variety of content notions at once. For example C{pr1,fr1}((57b))
is the proposition that the Pope is possibly right, and11 Cpr1,imp1((57b)) the
proposition that the Pope is not necessarily right.
In order to determine e.g. Cimp1((57b)), the proposition implicated by a
sentence (the type of content we will often need), we will use a more so-
phisticated two-dimensional semantics, allowing us to determine such open
propositions. Our strategy is to interpret the layers we want to evaluate,
against a certain background of contextually given information, more specif-
ically we will use a set of layers of our LDRS and a (Kaplanian) context
parameter to construct an anchor, i.e. another partial embedding, to en-
sure definedness. In order to make this work we need a two-dimensional
Kaplan-style semantics, so first we add a set of contexts C to our models:12
(62) A Kaplanian modelM is a structure 〈D,W,C,R, I〉 s.t. 〈D,W,R, I〉
is an intensional model and C ⊆W .
Now, in order to define Kaplanian content, we take a set of layers K and
evalute an LDRS with respect to those layers and a context c. If the result
is a singleton set, we take the embedding therein to provide referents in
order to close of our open proposition. The final result will be a singular
proposition since the originally free markers get their referents from the
context, not the world of evaluation:
11Leaving out subscripted and other obvious braces for convenience here and in the
following.
12If we want to give a plausible treatment of indexicals as rigidly referring terms, we
should take W to include not only the traditional full omnispatial possible world, but also
smaller located situations so that we can define C as the set of ‘small’ possible worlds,
viz. those with e.g. a unique speaker. This inclusion of C in W also necessitates the use





= CfL(ϕ) if ‖ϕ‖∅K,c = {f}
undefined otherwise
For the application of LDRT to denial we need the notion defined below as
C∗L(ϕ), the normal L-content if possible, but otherwise a suitable Kaplanian
proposition, viz. one backgrounding/rigidifying only as many layers as is
necessary to ensure definedness with respect to the actual utterance context
c:
(64) a. Cl(ϕ,L) = the smallest K ⊆ Λ0 s.t. KK,cL (ϕ) ↓ (‘Closure set’)
b. C∗L(ϕ)
{
= KCl(ϕ,L),cL (ϕ) if CL(ϕ) ↑
= C(Lϕ) otherwise
As an example, consider again the possibly right pope of (57): we saw that
Cimp1((57b)) is undefined because the implicature layer lacks a reference
marker. Assuming the context of utterance is c and is such that it contains
but one unique Pope, we can easily check the following:
(65) a. ‖(57b)‖imp1,w ↑ for all w
b. Kpr1,cimp1((57b)) ={w ∈W | the Pope of c is not necessarily right in w}
(i.e. the singular proposition that the actual Pope (at the con-
text of utterance c) is not necessarily right)
c. Cl((57b), imp1) = pr1




4.3 Directed reverse anaphora
The reverse anaphora algorithm depends on Off, a mechanism for sing-
ling out offensive material from an utterance that has been denied by a
subsequent utterance. Off is defined as in (66), where L and K are sets of
labels.
(66) Off(ϕ,K) = the smallest L ⊆ Λ0 s.t. C∗L(ϕ) ∩ C∗K(ϕ) = ∅
So Off(ϕ,K) gives us a set of labels that, in ϕ, clashes with a given set K,
in other words, the smallest set of layers disjoint from K that cause ϕ as a
whole to be contradictory.
To direct the reverse anaphora mechanism in an assertion-denial-correction
sequence, σ1-σ2-σ3 (as in (49)), we again represent the contribution of σ2
by a condition of the form ¬fr2 [ ? : ? ], as in 3.4. This however does not
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suffice for Off to determine which layer is offensive, since there is no con-
tradiction yet. We thus first add the layered contribution of σ3, causing a
contradiction somewhere in our growing LDRS (say ψ). We then determine
the cause of the contradiction on the basis of the fr-content of the correc-
tion: Off(ψ, {fr3}). The conflicting material in the offensive layer is now
moved, by the modified reverse anaphora mechanism, to the place of the ?s
thus ending up under the negation in layer fr2.
Formally this comes down to the following redefinition of reverse anaphora,
RA∗
(67) RA∗i (ϕ) = move UOff(ϕ,fri) and ConOff(ϕ,fri) from their original
position in ϕ to where the ?’s are in ϕ (then erase the ?’s)13,14
Interpretation now proceeds as follows:
- If 〈σi, σi+1, σi+2〉 is an assertion-denial-correction sequence, then ϕi+1 =
Res(ϕi ⊕ Prel(σi+1)) = ϕi⊕
[







- Otherwise, ϕi+1 = Res(ϕi ⊕Prel(σi+1)) and similarly for ϕi+2
In the next section we will illustrate the workings of the definitions given
above by applying them to some selected examples.
4.4 Examples II
Consider first the example of an implicature denial, i.e. (57), we analysed in
section 3.5 by means of the undirected variant:
(68) σ1 It is possible the Pope is right.
13ϕ	 ϕOff(ϕ,{fri+2})
[
[ ? : ? ]7→ ϕOff(ϕ,{fri+2})
]
14Instead of moving the whole offensive layer determined by Off we may need an even
more finegrained Reverse Anaphora algorithm moving only the smallest inconsistent sub-
DRS within that layer. This is essentially what Van Leusen’s (to appear) ‘nonmonotonic
updating’ does in order to account for the discourse effects of denials and corrections in a
compositional, monostratal variant of DRT. Something like this finer grained targetting of
offensive stuff is needed to solve the problems posed by multiple accommodation (52b) and
the Strawson example (51b). A definition of ‘offensive material, conflicting with correction
σi’, depending on the notion of syntactic DRS inclusion, v, would have to be added:
(i) OFF(ϕ, i) = the v-smallest subDRS ψ,
ψ v 〈UOff(ϕ,fri), ConOff(ϕ,fri)〉, s.t.
C∗Off(ϕ,fri)(ψ) ∩ C∗fri(ϕ) = ∅
and RA∗ would be modified accordingly:
(ii) RA∗′ = move OFF(ϕ, i) to the position of the ?’s.
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σ2 No, it’s not POssible,
σ3 it’s NEcessary that he’s right.
We assume that the denial σ2 pertains only to part of the content of σ1 and
that the correction σ3 indicates that only the implicature is at stake. The
step-by-step interpretation process of this dialogue according to the Directed
Reverse Anaphora algorithm is shown below:
- ϕ0 = [x0 : pope0(x)]
- Prel(σ1) =
[
xpr1 : popepr1(x),3fr1 [: rightfr1(x)],¬2imp1 [: rightimp1(x)]
]
- ϕ1 = Res(ϕ0 ⊕Prel(σ1)) =
[





: ¬fr2 [? : ?]
]
- ϕ2 = Res(ϕ1 ⊕Prel(σ2)) =
[
x0 : pope0(x), 3fr1 [: rightfr1(x)],
¬2imp1 [: rightimp1(x)], ¬fr2 [? : ?]
]
- Prel(σ3) = [zpr3 : mascpr3(z), 2fr3 [: rightfr3(z)]]
- ψ = Res(ϕ2 ⊕Prel(σ3)) =
[
x0 : pope0(x), 3fr1 [: rightfr1(x)],
¬2imp1 [: rightimp1(x)], ¬fr2 [? : ?], 2fr3 [: rightfr3(x)]
]
- Cl(ψ, fr3) = {0}, so C∗fr3(ψ) is K
0,c
fr3
(ψ), i.e. the singular proposition
that the actual Pope at the time of utterance is necessarily right (see
(57))
- Off(ψ, fr3) = {imp1}, because C∗imp1(ψ) is the, again singular, proposi-
tion that the actual Pope is not necessarily right one, which obviously
contradicts C∗fr3(ψ)
- ϕ3 = RA∗(ψ) =
[
x0 : pope0(x), 3fr1 [: rightfr1(x)],¬2imp1 [: rightimp1(x)], ¬fr2 [: ¬2imp1 [: rightimp1(x)]],
2fr3 [: rightfr3(x)]
]
Note that (van der Sandt 1991) and our implementation thereof was able
to handle this example, too, giving an equivalent representation as the final
output. However, in the course of the resolution process it temporarily threw
out the whole contribution of the assertion objected to.
The example in (53), repeated below as (69), shows that such an omni-
layered removal is problematic:
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(69) σ1 Now, THAT’s a nice lady
σ2 Yes, she is,
σ3 but she’s not a LAdy,
σ4 she’s my WIfe
The earlier monostratal proposal would in effect first have to somehow ac-
knowledge that the person referred to is both nice and female with σ2, but
then by reverse anaphora remove that information from the discourse repre-
sentation along with everything else conveyed by σ1. The information that
this person is female is then restored with the correction σ4, but the sug-
gestion that she is nice does not survive. To see how the layered version
handles this case, note first that this example is a little more involved than
the previous ones since it features an affirmation or acknowledgement, σ2,
of (part of the content of) σ1, before the familiar denial (σ3) and correction
(σ4).15
- ϕ0 = [x0 : woman0(x),pointed at0(x)]
(we start with a representation of someone’s pointing at a woman)
- Prel(σ1) = [ypr1 : pointed atpr1(y), ladyfr1(y), nicefr1(y),
strangerimp1(y)]
(assuming the use of ‘a lady’ invokes the implicature that the person
referred to is not a close relative of the addressee)
- ϕ1 = [x0 : woman0(x),pointed at0(x), ladyfr1(x), nicefr1(x),
strangerimp1(x)]
- Prel(σ2) = [zpr2 : fempr2(z),nicefr2(z)]
(affirmation is treated just like asserted content)




: ¬fr3 [? : ?]
]
(the negative sentence σ3 is marked as a denial)
- ϕ3 =
[
x0 : woman0(x),pointed at0(x), ladyfr1(x), nicefr1fr2(x),
strangerimp1(x), ¬fr3 [? : ?]
]
- Prel(σ4) = [wpr4 : fempr4(w),wifefr4(w)]
15The formal handling of affirmations like this in the current framework necessitates
among other things some minor revision of the assumed consecutive numberings in the
formal definitions of section 4.3. We will not spell out the details.
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- ψ = Res(ϕ3⊕Prel(σ4)) =
[
x0 : woman0(x), pointed at0(x), ladyfr1(x),
nicefr1fr2(x), strangerimp1(x), ¬fr3 [? : ?], wifefr4(x)
]
- Off(ψ, fr4) = imp1, since C∗fr4 ∩ C∗imp1 = K
0,c
fr4
∩ K0,cimp1 = ∅ (the two
singular propositions in question, viz. that that woman (contextually,
rigidly singled out by a pointing) is my wife, and that that woman is
some attractive stranger, respectively, contradict each other)
- ϕ4 = RA∗(ψ) =
[
x0 : woman0(x), pointed at0(x), ladyfr1(x),
nicefr1fr2(x), strangerimp1(x), ¬fr3 [: strangerimp1(x)],wifefr4(x)
]
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a representational account of the discourse func-
tion of denial in an extension of DRT. We treated the resolution of various
kinds of denial as an anaphoric process which is similar to the standard
process of presupposition and pronoun resolution in that it encodes a flow
of information through the DRS under construction. The crucial difference
with the standard algorithm is that this process takes place in reverse or-
der. It inserts the information attached to the sentence objected to at the
site of the denial and simultaneously performs a correction operation on the
information already established in the DRS that resulted from the previous
utterance. A formal implementation required an extension of the DRT appa-
ratus. We first provided a means to keep track of who said what in a dialogue
in order to locate and remove a previous contribution. This first version fol-
lowed van der Sandt (1991) by removing the full contribution of a previous
utterance from the discourse record. We then adopted a further extension
(LDRT) to an encode and interpret various kinds of semantic and pragmatic
information. This enabled us to direct the reverse anaphora mechanism to
the offensive material only. In this framework we presented directed reverse
anaphora which allowed us to direct and limit the retraction procedure to
the offensive part of a previous utterance. The mechanism was able to do
so by providing a means to formally interpret information that historically
has been labeled pragmatic and non-truth-conditional in nature. The ac-
count has the advantage of being more general than Horn (1989) and Geurts
(1998) in retaining a unified account of the propositional, implicature and
presuppositional denials, providing a general semantics and accounting for
the function of denials in terms of their non-monotonic discourse effects.16
16One might think that the style and register cases, discussed in Horn (1989) would
escape our treatment since the information objected too does not seem propositional in
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